The cause of his battle is a series of recent decisions in which the Court has relied on principles of federalism to limit Congress's power over states. 4 These federalism decisions, Noonan contends, so limit Congress's power that they pose a "present danger to the exercise of democratic government." 5 Judge Noonan joins legions of commentators in criticizing the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions as pestilential.
6 Judge Noonan's criticism has attracted particular attention, however, partly because of who he is. 7 He is a sitting federal judge who is bound to apply the precedent he criticizes; 8 he is a highly regarded conservative attacking the work product of fellow conservatives on the Court; 9 and he has published dozens of respected works on law and on Roman-Catholic theology. )).
14. See, e.g., id. at 15-18 (subsection of Chapter One entitled "The Lustrous Experiment," drawn from JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 75-91 (1998)).
15. Id. at 41 (Chapter Two). 16. Id. at 58 (Chapter Three). 17. Id. at 41 ("Samuel Simple, a federal appellate judge in San Francisco, had completed his pilgrim's process in the intricate forest of the first amendment as it touches on religion when he encountered the cases of the past five years restricting the power of federal law and invalidating new and old acts of Congress."); see also id. at 139 ("Holmes and Brandeis have become secular saints.").
18. Id. at I-II (emphases added).
discusses City of Boerne v. Flores, 12 in which the Court struck down part of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 13 As the name of that statute declares, it concerns religious liberty, a subject to which Judge Noonan devotes a homily in Chapter One.
14 Noonan continues the religious theme as he discusses the Court's post-Boerne decisions in later chapters. For example, he gives later chapters titles such as "Superior Beings"
15 and "Votaries." 16 He calls himself a "pilgrim." 17 Complementing this religious imagery, Noonan expresses righteous indignation, often mounting to religious fury, throughout the book. He strikes that tone in the opening words of his prologue, as he summarizes with escalating, vicarious emotion three decisions that he will criticize:
If you were a writer whose short stories were published by an ethnic press affiliated with the University of New Mexico, you would be justifiably surprised to learn that, when your publisher disregarded your copyright, you could not sue for damages because the press was a sovereign entitled to a sovereign's immunity from suit. If you were a professor of business at the University of Montevallo in Shelby County, Alabama, and were passed over for a raise because of your age, you would be understandably indignant to learn that your university, classified as a sovereign, could not be brought to court for violating federal law against discrimination based on age. If you were a woman attending a state college and you were raped by several members of the football team, you would be more than outraged to discover that, when state authorities did nothing to punish the rapists, federal law was helpless to make up for their deficiency. Yet these and similar results have been reached in the last five years because of judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States. 18 In addition to setting the tone, this passage foreshadows Judge Noonan's role in this book as a champion for the victims of the Court's federalism decisions.
The book's religious imagery and rhetoric aim to proselytize. Judge Noonan seeks a larger audience than has previously paid attention to the 19 . See Greenhouse, supra note 7 (stating that Noonan's book attempts to "[r]ouse the sleeping public"); Simon Lazarus, The Court Runs Amok, BLUEPRINT, Nov.-Dec. 2002 (stating that Noonan's book "is intended to fill th [e] gap" created by the fact that the "alarums" expressed about the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions "have gone largely unnoticed outside of academia"), available at http://www.ndol. org/blueprint/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) ; see also NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 143 (justifying the book on these grounds: "The sovereign remedy for ills in a democracy is exploration and exposition of a problem, leaving it to the good sense of those who can effect its solution to take the necessary steps."); see also infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing the role in which Noonan casts himself in the book).
20. [ing] issue with the naked hypocrisy of the Rehnquist faction"); Greenhouse, supra note 7, at 8 (praising Noonan's book for exposing " [t] he real error of the court's federalism decisions"); Lazarus, supra note 19 (praising the book as presenting a "refreshingly concise argument" that "illuminate[s]" a "constitutional crisis"); The Supreme Court Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at A16 (citing Noonan's book with approval); Judicial Hypocrisy, supra note 7 (expressing hope that the conservative majority of the current Court will be "chastened by" the "persuasive critique" of Judge Noonan, a "fellow conservative").
22. Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the States, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) ; see also Fein, supra note 8, at 19 (stating that Senator Schumer "summoned" Judge Noonan to testify about his book).
23. The Supreme Court Returns, supra note 21 ("Many of the court's decisions on states' rights have been widely criticized. John Noonan Jr., a federal appeals court judge appointed by President Ronald Reagan, argued in . . . 'Narrowing the Nation's Power,' that the court's recent federalism rulings profoundly misread the Constitution.").
Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions, and he hopes to turn his readers, especially conservative ones, against those decisions.
19 Indeed, but for its secular subject, Noonan's book would fit comfortably within a long Christian tradition of religious rhetoric. 20 It is not yet clear whether Judge Noonan will win many converts. True, some commentators have hailed Judge Noonan like the residents of Selena must have greeted St. George when he and the king's daughter entered town with the dragon on a leash. 21 Furthermore, soon after the book came out, Democratic Senator Charles Schumer arranged a hearing on the book before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 22 More than a year after its publication, the book is still being written about in mass media such as the and in law reviews. 24 Much of the commentary, however, has been negative.
25
Judge Noonan's hagiographers cannot celebrate yet. This review assesses whether a celebration is in the offing that would suit an author whom Professor Mary Ann Glendon calls "one of the legal giants of the twentieth century" and Judge Richard Posner calls one of the "great scholars of modern law." 26 The review concludes that Noonan's book will be celebrated for its influence but not for its legal scholarship. Noonan's legal analysis is flawed, to the extent that it is original. Furthermore, Judge Noonan's overheated rhetoric about the "present danger" posed by the Boerne line of cases ignores the broader legal context, in which state sovereignty is steadily becoming less terroristic. This review nonetheless predicts that, despite the book's flaws-indeed, because of them-the book will come to be regarded as a signal event in the crusade against state sovereignty.
Part II of this review describes the flaws in Noonan's legal analysis and shows that they stem from his choice of the wrong dragon. 27 The source of the pestilence abroad in the land is not the Rehnquist Court. The true source of the evil is an old concept of "residuary" state sovereignty that arguably survived and was implicit in the original Constitution. 28 The current Court serves only as the handmaiden-albeit a cheerful one-to this aging dragon of state sovereignty.
Part III explains why this dragon is not only aging; it is dying. less as Congress regulates more and more. 29 When the states can regulate, they often do so within the confines of programs of cooperative federalism.
30
As to the defensive attributes of state sovereignty, much of the states' armor of sovereign immunity has been stripped away by state statutes and state court decisions eliminating immunity. 31 Moreover, to the extent that states retain sovereign immunity as a matter of state law, Congress can carve away pieces of that immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, if it uses a keen enough blade. 32 Part IV argues that Noonan's role in the crusade against state sovereignty is important despite-indeed, because of-his erroneous targeting of the Rehnquist Court as the source of "present danger." Although Noonan's legal analysis is flawed, he draws serious blood because he dwells on the human costs of upholding claims of state sovereignty, and he vividly, though inaccurately, depicts them as inflicted by a callous set of five current Justices. He is the selfless hero who does battle with that evil entity on behalf of its human victims and the greater public good. The impact of the Court's federalism decisions on ordinary people has been largely hidden from the public and forms the soft underbelly of state sovereignty. By dramatically exposing and hacking away at this weak spot, Noonan's book greatly furthers the crusade.
This review nonetheless does not have an entirely happy ending. For the very same reason that Judge Noonan's book effectively exposes problems in the law of state sovereignty, it suggests illegitimate solutions. Noonan encourages his readers to believe that the problems in the law stem from a personnel problem on the current Court. He strongly suggests that the most logical solution is the removal or coercion of the current, wrongheaded Justices.
33
That solution, however, would pose a greater threat to the constitutional order than the precedent that Noonan challenges.
II. ERRANT KNIGHT NOONAN
St. George happens upon the dragon just as it is about to kill the king's daughter, whose life, the legend implies, has special value compared to that 50 RFRA invalidated any law that substantially burdened religion unless the law was the "least restrictive" way to further a "compelling" government interest. 51 Congress justified RFRA's application to state and local laws under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to "enforce" the Amendment with "appropriate" legislation. 52 In Boerne, the Court held that, as applied to state and local laws, RFRA exceeded Congress's Section 5 power because of its "lack of proportionality or congruence" to the elimination of state and local violations of the Free Exercise Clause.
53
Judge Noonan calls Boerne's "congruence and proportionality" test an "invention" of the majority. 54 He protests: "Proportionality in legislation! Who would measure the proportion? Implicitly, the answer was 'the court.' What measure would the court use? Implicitly, the answer was 'whatever we find handy.' . . . Was there anything but subjective feeling for the justices to use as a measuring stick?" 55 Repeatedly, Judge Noonan insists that Boerne's congruence and proportionality test reflects "new criteria."
56 He believes the Boerne majority invented those criteria to restore "the autonomy, the dignity, the sovereignty of the fifty states." [W]here a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways-the Court has closely scrutinized the statute's impact on those interests, but refrained from employing a simple test that effectively presumes unconstitutionality. Rather, it has balanced interests. And in practice that has meant asking whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon the others (perhaps, but not necessarily, because of the existence of a clearly superior, less restrictive alternative). Id. See also Young, supra note 25, at 1576 (making the same point).
62. See NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 8, 40, 110, 132 (noting that dissenting Justices in Boerne and its progeny have never criticized the congruence and proportionality test as unprecedented). Judge Noonan says that "[t]wo of the three dissenters [in Boerne] explicitly agreed with" the "test of congruence and proportionality." Id. at 40. It appears, however, that the only dissenting Justice in Boerne who endorsed the test was Justice O'Connor. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 545 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority that "whether Congress has exceeded its § 5 powers turns on whether there is a 'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end'") (quoting majority opinion). Although Judge Noonan cited Justice Breyer's dissent as also endorsing the test, Justice Breyer actually declined to join the paragraph of Justice O'Connor's dissent in which she endorsed the test. See id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting congruence, balancing the scope and effect of challenged legislation-including the burden it placed on states-against the Fourteenth Amendment "evil" that the legislation was meant to combat.
60
More generally, the Court uses similar means-ends tests in other areas of the law. 61 The existence of precedent for Boerne's "congruence and proportionality" test presumably explains why the dissenting Justices in Boerne and later cases applying the Boerne test never criticized the test as unprecedented.
62 Judge Noonan muses, "[t]he absence of challenge to the creation of new criteria vitally affecting the balance between the courts and Congress was an unusual characteristic of the [Boerne] case."
63 He does not acknowledge that this characteristic undermines his claim that the Boerne test was an "invention."
64
What is new about Boerne is the stringency with which the Court applies the congruence and proportionality test. 65 As Judge Noonan recognizes at one point, however, this stringency was born not so much out of a desire to protect state sovereignty as out of a desire to punish Congress for attempting, in 66. See NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 11 ("It is my observation in 'The Battle of Boerne' that the Supreme Court, in repelling what it saw as an invasion of the judicial domain by Congress, invented criteria for Congress that invaded the legislative domain."); id. at 37 ("The court's real quarrel with RFRA was that RFRA made incidental burdens on free exercise provable as substantial burdens that prohibited free exercise in violation of the first amendment. The court's position was that only purposeful persecution constituted prohibition.").
67. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 68. NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 140; see also id. at 9 (charging that the Court has "an agenda"); id. at 113 (referring to "an innovative and entrenched group of five justices committed to an agenda controlled by sovereign immunity"); id. at 139 ("If five members of the Supreme Court are in agreement on an agenda, they are mightier than five hundred members of Congress with unmobilized or warring constituencies.").
69 ("What is most fundamentally at issue in the Court's recent opinions is the structure of the constitutional relationship that will obtain between the Court and Congress.").
71. See NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 23-26 (criticizing Smith as a "backslide," "shock[ing]," an "abandonment of established precedent," and reflecting "insensitivity . . . to the requirements of conscience"; also quoting with apparent approval a description of Smith as "the Dred Scott of first amendment law"); see also Epstein, supra note 25, at 51 (stating that "Noonan would have been on strong ground if he had openly urged the Supreme Court to overrule Smith").
72. See NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 31 (stating that precedent "pointed to RFRA, to overrule the Court's decision in Smith. 66 Boerne is thus better understood as the Court's reaction to one federal statute that was singularly offensive to the Court's authority to "say what the law is" 67 than as the Court's pursuit of "an agenda for restoring power to the several states." 68 So understood, Boerne is not so much evidence that the Court is "siding with the States," 69 as it is evidence of the Court protecting its interpretive turf from congressional trespass. 70 Certainly, one can criticize the Court for using a stringent version of the congruence and proportionality test not only in Boerne but also in later cases involving federal statutes that, unlike RFRA, did not aim to overrule the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Judge Noonan, however, does not mount that criticism and is not in a good position to do so. True, the Court in Boerne was arguably overreacting to Congress's disagreement with the Court's decision in Smith. So too, however, it appears that Judge Noonan overreacts to Boerne largely because of his disagreement with Smith (and his corresponding allegiance to RFRA). 71 Perhaps it all just goes to show that: (1) reasonable minds can differ about the proper standard for analyzing Congress's Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) reasonable minds can also differ about the substance of Fourteenth Amendment rights; (3) reasonable minds would agree that the first issue-i.e., the proper standard for Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power-is logically distinct from the second issue-i.e., the Fourteenth Amendment's substance; and yet (4) reasonable minds can allow their views on the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment to influence their views on the standard for analyzing Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. None of this establishes Judge Noonan's thesis that the test of Boerne is the "unprecedented" "invention" of the current Court.
73

B. Post-Boerne Cases Involving State Sovereign Immunity
In five cases after Boerne, the Court used Boerne's "congruence and proportionality" test to strike down federal statutes that exposed the states to private actions from which they would otherwise have sovereign immunity. 74 Before discussing those post-Boerne cases, Judge Noonan devotes Chapters Two and Three of his book to the history and a modern critique of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. 75 His general discussion of the doctrine and his specific critique of each of the five post-Boerne cases are discussed separately below. The Samuel Simple chapters undermine Judge Noonan's characterization of the entire Boerne line of cases as unprecedented. After all, the decisions after Boerne concern a doctrine that is so well-established that it spouts from the people whom Judge Simple runs across in the course of a day. If the doctrine is so well-established, how can Judge Noonan blame it on the Rehnquist Court?
Noonan's General Discussion of State Sovereign Immunity
Apparently to avoid that question, Judge Noonan is slippery when describing the post-Boerne decisions on state sovereign immunity. Twice he describes them as "surpris[ing]," 82 even apart from their use of Boerne's congruence and proportionality test. In a similar vein, he says they reflect "a continuing struggle between an innovative and entrenched group of five justices committed to an agenda controlled by sovereign immunity and a minority, one vote short, attempting to defend positions once believed to be established."
83
Those statements imply the Boerne line of cases makes innovations in the law of sovereign immunity. Elsewhere in the book, however, Noonan calls sovereign immunity an "ancient concept" 84 and criticizes the Court for relying on this "relic of the past." 85 In the end, Noonan is coy about who is to blame for the current doctrine of state sovereign 86. Id. at 151. 87. See, e.g., id. at 9 (describing federalism decisions of the current Court as "boldly innovative" and "highly original," and reflecting an "adventurous" reading of the Constitution); id. at 10 (describing the current Court as "inventive").
88. See id. at 9 ("The court's rejection of 'ahistorical literalism' is a turn toward a more adventurous reading of the constitution."); see also Greenhouse, supra note 7 (quoting Noonan's use of adjective "audacious" and treating it as Noonan's description of the current Court).
89. NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 3; see also id. at 154-55 (arguing that "the immunity of the states has, as it were, metastasized" so that "there are not fifty sovereigns in America, but at least two thousand entitled to claim the dignity and protection that accompany the title").
90. See, e.g., id. at 57 ("The modern court has denounced fidelity to the words of the constitution as 'ahistorical literalism.'") (emphasis added) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999)); id. at 63 (referring to "our modern justices for whom sovereign immunity is central") (emphasis added); id. at 170 (identifying "modern justices attached to the text" of the Constitution as Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas) (emphasis added).
immunity. He says in his closing pages that the doctrine's constitutional status rests on an "audacious addition" to constitutional text. 86 He does not, at that point, identify who is responsible for this "audacious addition." The term "audacious" is quite similar, though, to adjectives he uses elsewhere to describe the Rehnquist Court's decisions. 87 Moreover, the charge of making an "audacious addition" to constitutional text asserts the very sin of which he finds the Rehnquist Court guilty. 88 Yet, Noonan never comes out and says that the Rehnquist Court is responsible for the audacious interpretations that have constitutionalized state sovereign immunity. That is because he could not say so truthfully.
The careful reader will discover only one way in which Judge Noonan asserts that the post-Boerne decisions extend sovereign immunity, and even this limited assertion is misleading. He claims that a "modern gloss by the Supreme Court" expands sovereign immunity to subunits of the states such as state universities.
89 By using the adjective "modern," Noonan implies that this gloss is that of the Rehnquist Court. 90 Elsewhere, though, Judge Noonan admits that the extension of state sovereign immunity to the state subunits-which are known as "arms" of the state in the precedent-dates back to at least 1921; his admission is so subtle, however, that few readers expanded state sovereign immunity because it is an easy way for the Court to increase state power at the expense of national power. 103 That path is easy because so much precedent supports a broad view of state sovereign immunity.
Thus, even granting Judge Noonan's assertion that the Boerne test was new, the five post-Boerne cases applying that test to uphold claims of sovereign immunity did not break any ground that had not been broken in Boerne. Judge Noonan's characterization of the Boerne line of cases as unprecedented is, at best, accurate only for the first of the six cases in that line, Boerne itself.
Aside from Judge Noonan's attempt to portray state sovereign immunity as having been extended by the Rehnquist Court, his legal analysis merely repeats the standard criticisms. Thus, he argues that sovereign immunity is not supported by the text, structure, or history of the Constitution and serves no useful purpose today.
104 This review will not add to the ink spilled on that subject other than to state the counter-arguments. 105 Sovereign immunity has as much basis in the text and structure of the Constitution as does judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. 106 Historical support for state sovereign immunity's constitutional status comes from, among other places, the writings of Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall. 107 Finally, although the modern usefulness of state sovereign immunity is relevant to whether immunity should be eliminated or reduced by political means, such as state legislation waiving the immunity and federal legislation abrogating it, its modern usefulness is not so clearly relevant to its constitutional status. 
Noonan's Discussion of Specific Cases
In addition to his broad attack on state sovereign immunity, Judge Noonan criticizes each decision in which the Court has used Boerne's "congruence and proportionality" test to invalidate federal statutes overriding state sovereign immunity. His individualized criticism mostly echoes his general objections to the doctrine. The main respects in which his casespecific analyses differ from his generalized critique are discussed below. They suffer from some of the same flaws as his general critique, yet add other distinctive ones.
a. The College Savings Bank Cases
In a pair of post-Boerne cases involving the same private plaintiff and the same state defendant, the Court invalidated federal statutes exposing the states to private actions for patent infringement and Lanham Act violations. 110 In both cases, the defendant was a state agency, the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary College Expense Board, that, in competition with a private company, the plaintiff College Savings Bank, sold investment instruments to help people save for college tuition.
111
The Court held that sovereign immunity barred the private company's patent infringement and Lanham Act claims against the Board.
112 Judge Noonan criticizes the Court's College Savings Bank decisions primarily on two grounds. The first reflects a dispute with long-standing precedent; the second is cogent, but of decreasing importance. First, Judge Noonan does not think a state should escape liability when it carries on commercial activities, such as selling investment instruments, rather than traditional governmental activities. 114 This particularly troubles him when the state's conduct infringes a patent, because patents are a "cherished creation of the constitution."
115 Judge Noonan has a point. It seems unfair for a state to act like a private actor yet avoid liability for conduct for which a private actor would be liable. Nonetheless, the Court has never recognized an exception to sovereign immunity for the states' commercial activities. 116 Judge Noonan again joins many commentators in criticizing Kimel, in which the Court held that states cannot be sued for money damages by their employees for age discrimination.
121
Judge Noonan identifies the "fundamental" flaw of Kimel to be its premise that age discrimination can be rational.
122 He observes that, in an earlier case, the Court found it "probably not true" that most judges "suffer significant deterioration in performance at age 70."
123 Generalizing from this finding, Noonan asks, "Why should what was 'probably not true' be taken as the basis for discrimination treated as rational?" 128. Evidence of this belief comes from his challenge to the stereotype that judges' performance deteriorates at age 70, see supra text accompanying notes 121-24, and from the solitary instance in the book in which he mentions a judge's age. See NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 99 (describing a dissenting opinion by "John Minor Wisdom, at age ninety-two one of the most respected of federal judges"). "rational basis" standard of equal protection review to uphold a Massachusetts law requiring police officers to retire at age 58. 126 The Court relied on that case in 1991 to uphold a state law requiring judges to retire at age 70.
As two commentators noted, no Justices in
127
Judge Noonan clearly disagrees with those decisions' interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. 128 The meaning of the Clause, however, poses a different issue from the issue of Congress's Section 5 power to enforce the Clause, which was the issue in Kimel.
129 Judge Noonan's attack on earlier cases involving the first issue does not impugn Kimel's ruling on the second issue unless one believes, as Judge Noonan appears to do at times, that Congress should be able to use Section 5 to alter the Court's interpretation of the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court struck down a provision in the Americans with Disabilities Act authorizing private actions against states for disability-based employment discrimination. 132 Aside from summarizing the facts and the majority and dissenting opinions, Noonan makes three assertions about Garrett: (2000)). 139. Id. at 607-27. 140. See NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 120-137. Judge Noonan describes the Court's Commerce Clause analysis but does not criticize it except to suggest that it was overly mechanical. See id. at 127 ("Gender-related crime did not have a commercial character. It was not a form of economic activity. QED: As neatly as a demonstration in geometry, the conclusion followed that Congress lacked the power in regulating commerce to ban violence against women.").
141. The first assertion means nothing; John Marshall is often invoked by commentators or dissenting Justices who believe that the majority has construed national power too narrowly. The second and third assertions make no sense. As to the second, the existence of a dissent that charges the majority with departing from precedent does not imply that the majority has deviated from precedent to an abnormal "degree." Likewise as to the third assertion, one cannot "measure" a majority's "shift" from the "middle ground" by the existence of a series of 5-4 decisions. Such a series often signifies only continuing disagreement between almost equally balanced factions.
d. United States v. Morrison
136
Morrison involved a lawsuit by Christy Brzonkala, a student at a state university, against two fellow students who raped her. 137 Brzonkala brought her action under the federal Violence Against Women Act, which authorized the victims of gender-motivated violence to sue the perpetrators in federal court. 138 The Court held that her action had to be dismissed because the Act exceeded Congress's powers under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
139 Judge Noonan savages the Court's Section 5 holding. 140 His attack relies on the gruesome facts alleged in the case and on novel legal arguments. Like much else in the book, Noonan's attack may inflame readers about the Court's decision, but it is poor legal analysis.
Judge Noonan signals the tone and factual focus of his discussion of Morrison in the title of his chapter about the case: "Gang Rape at State U."
141
He details the rape and the failure of the state university officials to do much about it. 142 He strongly implies that this failure stemmed from official incompetence and the alleged attackers' status as football players. 143 He labels
Tech has a fine reputation as a football power. In 1995 [the year after the alleged rape], it was to rank eighth in the nation."). 156. NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 13; see also id. at 26 (citing with apparent approval someone else's description of Boerne as "the Dred Scott of first amendment law").
157. Id. at 11 (referring to "the present danger to the vital balances of our organic national life); id. at 138 (titling a portion of the chapter "present damage, present danger"); id. at 140 (stating that "[t]he present damage" caused by the Court's decisions "points to the present danger to the exercise of democratic government").
158. Id. at 12.
attackers" standard does not match the facts of the case. As Judge Noonan observes, Brzonkala did not bring criminal charges against her attackers.
154
Nor, apparently, did she bring a civil action against them in state court based on state tort law.
155
In the absence of allegations that the university discouraged Brzonkala from resorting to the state civil and criminal justice system, it is hard to understand how it "shielded" her attackers except through inaction. If inaction is "shielding," however, the second step of Noonan's argument collapses into the first.
Judge Noonan's discussion of Morrison leaves us outraged at the apparent injustice in Ms. Brzonkala's case. Unfortunately, Noonan does not leave us with a plausible theory of why Congress had power to address that particular injustice with the particular remedy prescribed in the Violence Against Women Act.
III. SYMPATHY FOR THE DRAGON
Judge Noonan says that in its "substantial impact upon the nation" the Boerne line of decisions "invites comparison . . . with Dred Scott" and other notorious Court decisions. 156 Noonan insists that the harm is current; at least three times he refers to the "present danger" that the Boerne line of cases poses to the modern balance between state and federal power. 157 The most laudatory reviewers have not echoed those views, for good reason. Even if the decisions are wrong, they have not "returned the country to a pre-Civil War understanding of the nation," as Judge Noonan claims.
158 Viewed in the big picture and in an historical framework, the dragon of state sovereignty is not only old, but it is dying (or becoming domesticated)-partly because of decisions by the Rehnquist Court. Several factors produce the decrepitude.
First in line must come preemption. REV. 1911 REV. , 1918 REV. (1995 (noting that federal dollars represent increasing proportion of state revenues and that Congress usually attaches conditions to state and local government's receipt of those funds); Sarnoff, supra note 164, at 211 (arguing that delegation to states of overbroad federal regulatory power violates the Constitution).
166. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68 (referring to cooperative federalism programs with apparent approval). more preemptive legislation. 159 As a theoretical brake on that trend, the Court has articulated a presumption against interpreting federal statutes to preempt state regulation in traditional areas of state concern.
160 If applied consistently, that presumption would strengthen state sovereignty. As many commentators have observed, however, the Rehnquist Court does not apply the presumption consistently. 161 To the contrary, some of the Court's recent preemption decisions have construed federal statutes to have broad preemptive effect. 162 The Court's generous interpretation of federal preemptive legislation gives Congress power to diminish the areas in which states may regulate, thereby draining the swamp in which the dragon of state sovereignty has kept its lair.
This dragon is also increasingly girdled by programs of "cooperative federalism." 163 In those programs, Congress induces states to regulate in accordance with federal requirements in order to get federal money or avoid federal preemption. 164 Cooperative federalism programs probably will continue to grow and multiply. 165 The Court has shown no sign that it will curb that trend. 166 Thus, regardless of the Boerne line of cases, Congress can continue using cooperative federalism to keep the states on a short leash.
Preemptive federal legislation and cooperative federalism programs limit the states' regulatory power and discretion. In addition to these restrictions on the affirmative sovereign power to regulate, the state's defensive armor of sovereign immunity poses less of a "present danger" than many readers of Judge Noonan's book might suppose. Judge Noonan admits that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has exceptions that expose states to lawsuits. 167 He does not make clear that those exceptions permit judicial remedies for much wrongful state conduct. 168 In particular, state sovereign immunity is increasingly unavailable because more and more states have waived sovereign immunity by state legislation or state court decisions. 169 For example, many states have waived their immunity from many types of tort and contract claims. 170 Congress might be able to induce even more state waivers as a condition for states to get federal money and other benefits, 171 or, possibly, to avoid preemption. 172 In any event, most existing state-law waivers do not result from federal pressure. They probably result, instead, from political pressure by the states' own citizens. This should surprise no one. Many citizens no doubt share Judge Noonan's view that it is unfair for government to avoid liability for wrongs such as unduly burdening the exercise of religion; infringing on people's property rights; discriminating against people because of their age or disability; and allowing rapists to avoid punishment. Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court are not the only engines of improved fairness in the law. 173 Moreover, the Court recently confirmed that Congress can use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to slice away additional pieces of state sovereign immunity, if it uses a sharp enough blade. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court upheld a provision in the federal Family and Medical Leave Act abrogating state sovereign immunity. 174 The Hibbs Court concluded that the Act met Boerne's congruence and proportionality test. 175 Hibbs was decided after Judge Noonan published Narrowing the Nation's Power. Perhaps Hibbs demonstrates that the Court (like the states) responds to social pressures from sources such as Judge Noonan's popular book. 176 In short, the regulatory power of states exists only in puddles, and the armor of sovereign immunity exists only in patches. Of course, the dragon of state sovereignty can still burn people. States retain "residuary sovereignty," the exercise and non-exercise of which can harm as well as help.
177 Judge Noonan goes far wrong, though, in asserting that Boerne and the five postBoerne cases that he writes about will do much to counteract other forces that make the residuary sovereignty of the states increasingly residual.
IV. THE VIRTUE OF THE VICES OF NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER
This review has suggested so far that Narrowing the Nation's Power is a misdirected attempt to pile on to the already beleaguered dragon of state sovereignty. In so suggesting, this review joins those commentators who find the book's legal analysis flawed. 178 On the other hand, this review also joins other commentators who praise the book for making the arcane subject of state sovereignty accessible and engaging. 179 Prior commentary has not recognized the connection between this virtue of the book and its vices. The connection is this: If the book did not dramatize the legal developments discussed by depicting them as the malevolent invention of the current Court and as posing a "present danger" requiring knightly intervention on behalf of the Court's victims, the book would not have made the splash that it has. The problem with this approach is that it suggests that the most appropriate remedy is the removal or coercion of current Court personnel.
Tales of knights fighting dragons capture our imagination because they depict absolute good and evil as two living, breathing, distinct creatures-person vs. serpent-and because they have a plot-person slays serpent after fierce battle.
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Dragon tales captivate us despite-indeed, because of-the difficulty in the real world of identifying and separating good and evil and getting them to do glorious battle.
Similarly, Judge Noonan's book has gotten so much attention because it is a good yarn. First, Judge Noonan takes state sovereignty, an abstract concept that has been developed by many judges and historical forces, and 181. NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER, supra note 2, at 113 (referring to "a continuing struggle between an innovative and entrenched group of five justices committed to an agenda controlled by sovereign immunity and a minority, one vote short, attempting to defend positions once believed to be established"). makes it the "agenda" of the Rehnquist Court. 181 That Court imposes this agenda through an act of "Will":
The Court has enjoyed the prestige and the power conferred by the belief of its admirers.
Possessed of these advantages as it entered battle with Congress, the court is not invulnerable but stronger than Hamilton imagined. The Court, Hamilton wrote, has "neither Force nor Will," only judgment. He did not foresee a court with an agenda for restoring power to the several states. Such a court has "Will." This willful Court despises its human victims. Thus, it does not care that, after its College Savings Bank decision, patent holders have only a "mutilated kind of right to property." 184 That harm "was treated not only as collateral but as so inconsequential as not to be worthy of mention." 185 The Court in Kimel could be "insensitive" to the victims of age discrimination, for its members "had no personal experience of the bite of age discrimination. 187 Judge Noonan explains, "For the Supreme Court, proceeding as it appears to proceed in these cases with an agenda, . . . the persons affected are worthy of almost no attention."
188 They are sacrificed like so many sheep to the cause of state sovereignty.
The people cannot save themselves without a hero's intervention. True, Noonan writes, the Court "ultimately" may be "overwhelmed by the forces" of democracy, but that does not remove "the present danger to the exercise of democratic government" posed by the Court's decisions. 189 This is where Judge Noonan comes in. A democratic solution depends on the "exploration and exposition of a problem, leaving it to the good sense of those who can The book makes "available" to-i.e., capable of readily being called to mind by-members of the public a vivid story of the danger of state sovereignty.
196
The book makes the danger sound urgent, a "present danger." Equally important, the danger can hit close to home. After all, many readers can empathize with the victims of the Court's decisions, which include the members of a congregation, the owners of intellectual property, and the victims of employment discrimination and of rape. The book heightens reader anxiety by depicting the victimization as surprising and capricious. 197 The book warns: "This could happen to you."
The credibility of that warning is enhanced by Justice Noonan's reputation and the subject matter of Narrowing the Nation's Power. 198 As one reviewer put it, the book is "no rank diatribe by a Democratic appointee"; 199 it is instead written by a highly respected, seemingly objective, conservative scholar. Many readers who would not trust criticism of state sovereignty from perceived liberals will trust the very same criticism from Judge Noonan. Furthermore, by subscribing to Judge Noonan's views, conservative readers get the added bonus of affiliating with someone who is considered conservative, but unpredictable, because of the strength and independence of his intellect. 200 Few readers of any stripe are likely to study the relevant precedent themselves, because it is much less accessible and entertaining than Noonan's book. 201 The credibility of Noonan's book among conservatives is further enhanced by the many reasons that conservatives have to dislike strong state sovereignty. Many of those reasons brood just below the surface of Noonan's book. As discussed above, for example, conservatives who value religious liberty, such as Judge Noonan, hate Boerne because it perpetuates Smith's restrictive view of the Free Exercise Clause. 202 Many conservatives no doubt deplore the College Savings Bank cases because they let states escape liability for unlawfully competing with private enterprise and interfering with "cherished" property rights. 203 More generally, state sovereign immunity undermines government accountability to the rule of law, a cardinal conservative value. 204 Just as bad from a conservative viewpoint, state sovereign immunity is said to lack grounding in the plain text of the Constitution. 205 Maybe many conservatives have been waiting for a conservative opinion leader such as Judge Noonan to take up arms against the strong sovereignty model. 206 Depending on what arms are used, that mobilization would not necessarily bother even the current Justices responsible for recent precedent supporting strong state sovereignty. In Alden v. Maine, for example, the five so-called conservative Justices on the current Court praised states that have "mitigated" the "rigors" of sovereign immunity by waiving their immunity that the most logical and direct responses to the "present danger" 214 consist of removing or coercing the Justices that he has identified as the source of the danger. Followers of Judge Noonan are all the more likely to take away that impression because Judge Noonan initially proposed a similarly drastic response to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.
215
The suggested approach of removing or coercing the wrongheaded Justices has two flaws. First, as discussed above, it does not target the real source of the presently dangerous principles identified by Noonan; those principles predate the Rehnquist Court. 216 Furthermore, even if the conservative wing of the Rehnquist Court were to blame, that does not justify the threats of impeachment or budget cuts.
Those measures are inappropriate-not because one is too "heavy," 217 the other too "picayune"
218 -but because they are political retaliation for the Court's exercise of its power to "say what the law is." 219 To propose those responses (and dismiss them only because they are, in different ways, disproportionate) suggests that we should drop all pretense that the Court bases its decision on law and fight fire with fire.
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It is one thing to "rel[y] upon new appointments to the Court as the principal means of assuring its continuing identification with the felt necessities of the times." 221 It is another thing to make the current Justices change their minds by mutterings of impeachment and slashed budgets. The latter approach poses a greater danger to the current system than the Boerne line of cases.
222. The mixture of good and bad in Noonan's work calls to mind one legend in which, when St. George's mother is pregnant with him, an oracle predicts that she will give birth to a dragon, suggesting a similar mixture of good and evil. See Matzke, supra note 34, at 456.
V. CONCLUSION
Narrowing the Nation's Power has heroic and draconic qualities. 222 It is a heroic effort to focus public attention on the important but esoteric issue of the balance of power between states and the national government. In making that effort, Judge Noonan champions the individuals who lack meaningful remedies for state-caused injuries. This is all to the good. The darker side is that Noonan misleads readers into believing that the Rehnquist Court has invented the strong state sovereignty model and that it poses a present danger. This makes for a good read and may very well contribute to a wave of public hostility to residual features of state sovereignty, such as sovereign immunity. Unfortunately, the book suggests that the appropriate channel for this hostility is political retaliation against judges whose legal interpretations we do not like. That suggestion carries particularly unfortunate weight coming from a sitting federal court judge who claims no interest other than improving the law. Accepted for all it is worth, the suggested use of political retaliation would put the politicians who appoint, remove, and fund judges in a position relative to the institution of judicial review akin to the dragon outside the town of Selena. The institution, similar to the town, would be spared only as long as it regularly sacrificed individual judicial victims.
